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Abstract
This letter studies the problem of maintaining information freshness under passive eavesdropping
attacks. The classical three-node wiretap channel model is considered, in which a source aims to send
its latest status wirelessly to its intended destination, while protecting the message from being overheard
by an eavesdropper. Considering that conventional channel capacity-based secrecy metrics are no longer
adequate to measure the information timeliness in status update systems, we define two new age of
information-based metrics to characterize the secrecy performance of the considered system. We further
propose, analyze, and optimize a randomized stationary transmission policy implemented at the source
for further enhancing the secrecy performance. Simulation results are provided to validate our analysis
and optimization.
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I. INTRODUCTION
With the quick proliferation of the Internet of Things (IoT) technologies, more and more
devices and equipment are connected to the Internet. This brings severe security and privacy
concerns considering that a large share of devices will be served by wireless communication
technologies [1], [2]. Conventionally, various cryptography techniques have been invented and
applied at higher layers to protect the security of computer networks. However, these approaches
normally involve intensive computation, which could be time- and energy-consuming for low-
cost and low-complexity IoT devices. In this context, physical layer security techniques that
leverage the properties of wireless physical channels, such as interference and fading, to further
strengthen the security of wireless communication systems, have been regarded as appealing
complements or even alternative solutions [3].
The research on physical layer security was pioneered by Wyner in his seminal work [4], where
he proved that perfect secrecy can be realized when the channel from source to eavesdropper is
a degraded version of that from source to destination. Since then, enormous efforts have been
put to confound eavesdropping from either the perspective of information theory (see [5] and
references therein) or signal processing (see [6] for a comprehensive literature survey). These
studies were mainly built on the secrecy performance metrics like secrecy capacity and secrecy
outage probability, that are defined based on the information-theoretic channel capacity concept.
On the other hand, most IoT applications involve remote monitoring, where sensors are
deployed to monitor various physical processes, for example, the air pollution level and the
health conditions of running machines in a factory. The sensed information is then reported to a
remote entity like a cloudlet for further analysis. In these contexts, the information generally has
higher value when it is fresher. This represents a strong motivation for a proper characterization
of the information freshness. Recent results showed that conventional network metrics like
throughput or delay are no longer appropriate for quantifying the information freshness. A new
metric, termed age of information (AoI), has been coined in [7] for evaluating the information
freshness, which have attracted increasing attentions very recently [8]–[12]. The AoI is defined
as the time elapsed since the generation time of the last status update received at the destination.
In this context, a natural and fundamental question that arises is “how to quantify the secrecy
3performance of status update systems from the perspective of physical layer?” To the best of our
knowledge, this is still an open problem in the literature and this letter serves as the first attempt
to answer it. It is worth mentioning here a handful of studies that investigated the problem of
maintaining information freshness under active jamming attacks, see e.g., [13], [14], which is
fundamentally different from the passive eavesdropping attacks considered in this letter.
In this letter, we consider a status update system consisting of a source, a destination, and an
eavesdropper. The source aims to report its latest status to the destination under the risk of being
wiretapped by the eavesdropper. From a system security perspective, the source pursues the
information at the destination to be much fresher than that at the eavesdropper. To characterize
the secrecy performance of such a status update system, we define two new secrecy metrics
drawing on the AoI concept, namely secrecy age and secrecy age outage probability. We further
propose, analyze, and optimize a randomized stationary transmission policy adopted at the source
for enhancing the system secrecy performance. Simulation results are carried out to affirm our
analysis and design.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND NEW SECRECY METRICS
Consider a status update system consisting of a source (S), a destination (D), and an eaves-
dropper (E). Specifically, S aims to report its latest status update to D via an error-prone wireless
channel, while the passive adversary E attempts to eavesdrop the transmission of S to grasp
its latest status1. We assume slotted time, time is divided into slots of equal duration, and the
transmission of a status updates occupies one slot. The timeliness and freshness of status updates
at the receivers including D and E is measured by the AoI metric.
The generate-at-will status generation model is considered. That is, a new status update is
generated at S at the beginning of each time slot. However, S may choose to drop the newly
generated status according to different transmission policies to be elaborated later in this section.
In this letter, we investigate a challenging scenario, where S has no knowledge of the channel
conditions from itself to both D and E. Instead, it only knows the probabilities of its status update
transmissions to be successfully received by D and E, denoted by p and q, respectively. Here, to
make it general, we choose not to specify a particular channel fading model for characterizing
the successful transmission probabilities. This is because once the channel fading model is given,
we can link p and q with the average signal-to-noise ratios of the corresponding links.
1Note that successful eavesdropping is the first step towards launching other active attacks like replay attacks.
4We use ID(t) and IE(t) to denote the transmission success indicators of the S − D and
S − E, respectively. Specifically, IX(t) = 1, X ∈ {D,E}, if the status update over the S −X
link is successful during time slot t, and IX(t) = 0 otherwise. Denote by δD(t) and δE(t) the
instantaneous ages at D and E in the t-th time slot, respectively. The instantaneous ages of these
two receiving nodes in the time slot t+ 1 can then be expressed as
δX (t+ 1) =
 1, if S transmits, and IX (t) = 1,
δX (t) + 1, otherwise,
(1)
where X ∈ {D,E}.
A. New Secrecy Metrics
In this letter, we are interested in protecting the status update system against eavesdropping
attacks from the perspective of physical layer, which corresponds to the extreme adversary case
with no cryptography techniques implemented at higher layers. In this context, S can only
resort to the transmission policy to enhance the system secrecy performance. For conventional
channel capacity-based physical layer security metrics, such as secrecy capacity and secrecy
outage probability, have been defined and widely investigated for various network setups, see
e.g., the comprehensive survey papers [5], [6] and references therein. More specifically, denote
by CD and CE as the instantaneous channel capacity of the S−D and S−E links, respectively.
The secrecy capacity and secrecy outage probability can then be defined as Cs = [CD − CE]+
and Pr (Cs < Rs), respectively, with Rs representing the target secrecy rate. However, these
conventional secrecy metrics are no longer applicable to status update systems as they are
inadequate to quantify the information freshness.
As the first attempt to measure the secrecy performance of status update systems, we now
define two new secrecy metrics. Intuitively, to enhance the secrecy of the system, we should make
the instantaneous age at E larger than that at D as much as possible. That is, the information at E
is much staler than that at D. Motivated by this intuition and inspired by the conventional channel
capacity-based secrecy metrics, we devise two new secrecy metrics defined in the following:
Definition 1. We define the instantaneous secrecy age δs as
δs = [δE − δD]+, (2)
where [.]+ indicates max{δE − δD, 0}.
5Definition 2. We then define the secrecy age outage probability as
Pout = Pr
(
[δE − δD]+ ≤ ηth
)
, (3)
where ηth is the target information lag between E and D.
According to Definition 1-2, larger secrecy age and lower secrecy age outage probability are
more desirable.
B. Transmission Policy
We now describe the transmission policy proposed in this letter. Recall that we consider the
challenging case where S has no knowledge of the instantaneous channel state information of
both S −D and S − E links. Furthermore, there is no feedback from D, and thus S does not
grasp the instantaneous age at D either. For this case, we propose a randomized stationary policy
to be implemented at S. More specifically, S transmits a newly generated status update at the
beginning of each time slot with a fixed probability ptx. When ptx = 1, S always transmits a
new status update in each time slot. Note that no retransmission is considered in our policy since
we can generate a new status update in each time slot.
III. ANALYSIS AND OPTIMIZATION OF THE RANDOMIZED STATIONARY POLICY
A. Secrecy Performance Analysis
To evaluate the average secrecy performance of the randomized stationary policy, we apply
a two-dimension MC to characterize the state transition of the considered system, in which the
system state (m,n) indicates that the current age at D is m and that at E is n. We can readily
verify that the considered MC is irreducible and thus it admits a unique steady state distribution.
Denote by pi the steady state distribution of the considered system implementing the randomized
stationary policy, with the entry pii,j representing the steady probability of the state (i, j).
We first notice that the system can transit from any state to the state (1, 1) when S transmits and
the transmission is successfully received by both the legitimate receiver D and the eavesdropper
E. We thus have the following equation
∞∑
j=1
∞∑
i=1
pii,jptxpq = pi1,1. (4)
6By noting the fact
∑∞
j=1
∑∞
i=1 pii,j = 1, we then have pi1,1 = ptxpq. Furthermore,
∞∑
j=1
∞∑
i=1
pii,jptxp =
∞∑
j=1
pi1,j ⇒
∞∑
j=1
pi1,j = ptxp. (5)
∞∑
j=1
∞∑
i=1
pii,jptxq =
∞∑
i=1
pii,1 ⇒
∞∑
i=1
pii,1 = ptxq. (6)
pii+1,1 =
∞∑
j=1
pii,jptx(1− p)q, (7)
pi1,j+1 =
∞∑
i=1
pii,jptxp(1− q). (8)
pii+1,j+1 = pii,j [ptx(1− q)(1− p) + 1− ptx] . (9)
∞∑
j=1
pii+1,j =
∞∑
j=1
pii,j [ptx(1− p) + 1− ptx] (10)
∞∑
i=1
pii,j+1 =
∞∑
i=1
pii,j [ptx(1− q) + 1− ptx] (11)
Combining the equalities in (5) and (7), we have pi2,1 = ptxpptx(1−p)q. We then jointly consider
the equalities in (5) and (10) and attain
∞∑
j=1
pi2,j = ptxp [ptx(1− q) + 1− ptx] . (12)
Then, based on (12), (7) and (10), we can obtain the expressions of pi3,1 and
∑∞
j=1 pi3,j given by
pi3,1 = ptx(1− p)qptxp [ptx(1− q) + 1− ptx] ,
∞∑
j=1
pi3,j = ptxp [ptx(1− q) + 1− ptx]2 .
By forward induction, we further have
pii,1 = ptxpptx(1− p)q(ptx(1− p) + 1− ptx)i−2, ∀i ≥ 2.
Similarly, we obtain pi1,2 = ptxqptx(1 − q)p, pi1,j = ptxqptx(1 − q)p(ptx(1− q) + 1− ptx)j−2,
∀j ≥ 2, and
pii,j =pii−j+1,1[ptx(1− q)(1− p) + 1− ptx]j−1
=ptxpptx(1− p)q(ptx(1− p) + 1− ptx)i−j−1×
[ptx(1− q)(1− p) + 1− ptx]j−1, if i > j,
(13)
7pii,j =pi1,j−i+1[ptx(1− q)(1− p) + 1− ptx]i−1
=ptxqptx(1− q)p(ptx(1− q) + 1− ptx)j−i−1×
[ptx(1− q)(1− p) + 1− ptx]i−1, if j > i,
(14)
pii,i = pi1,1[ptx(1− q)(1− p) + 1− ptx]i−1
= ptxqp[ptx(1− q)(1− p) + 1− ptx]i−1, if i ≥ 1.
(15)
We now can derive closed-form expressions for the average secrecy age and the secrecy age
outage probability as follows
E [δs] = E
[
[δE − δD]+
]
=
∞∑
i=1
∞∑
j=i+1
pii,j(j − i)
=
∞∑
i=1
[ptx(1− q)(1− p) + 1− ptx]i−1×
∞∑
j=i+1
pi1,2(ptx(1− q) + 1− ptx)j−i−2(j − i)
(a)
=
1
ptx(p+ q − pq)
ptxqptx(1− q)p
(ptxq)
2 =
p(1− q)
ptxq(p+ q − pq) .
(16)
Pout = Pr
(
[δE − δD]+ ≤ ηth
)
=1− P ([δE − δD]+ > ηth) = 1− ∞∑
i=1
∞∑
j=i+1+ηth
pii,j
=1−
∞∑
i=1
[ptx(1− q)(1− p) + 1− ptx]i−1×
∞∑
j=i+1+ηth
pi1,2(ptx(1− q) + 1− ptx)j−i−2
(b)
=1− (1− q)p(1− ptxq)
ηth−1
p+ q − pq ,
(17)
where the equalities (a) and (b) follow by adopting the infinite sum equation given by [15, Eq.
0.231].
Remark 1. Based on the attained closed-from expressions given in (16) and (17), we can
readily verify that the average secrecy age E [δs] and the secrecy age outage probability Pout
are decreasing and increasing functions of the transmission probability ptx, respectively. We can
also see from (17) that when q → 0, Pout → 0.
8B. Optimization of the Transmission Probability
We now formulate a problem to optimize the transmission probability ptx at S. Intuitively,
the age at D is statistically smaller if S transmits more frequently with a larger ptx, which, on
the other hand, will cause a higher secrecy age outage probability (See Remark 1). Motivated
by this intuition, we formulate the following optimization problem
Problem 1 : max
ptx∈(0,1]
ptx [1− Pout (ptx)] . (18)
To resolve the above optimization problem, we calculate the first-order derivative of the objec-
tive function with respect to ptx and set it equal to zero. After some mathematical manipulations,
we can obtain that the optimal ptx is given by
p∗tx = min {1/(qηth), 1} . (19)
We note that the optimal transmission probability does not depend on p.
IV. SIMULATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS
We now present simulation results to validate the theoretical analysis conducted above and
illustrate the impacts of various parameters on the system secrecy performance.
We plot the curves of the average secrecy age versus the ratio p/q for different combinations
of q and ptx in Fig. 1. We can see from the figure that the simulation results match well with
their analytical counterparts, which verifies the correctness of our theoretical analysis in Section
III. Moreover, for fixed q and ptx, the average secrecy age increases as p increases. This is
expected since a larger p means a higher successful transmission probability over the S − D
link. On the other hand, when p and ptx are given, the larger the value of q, the smaller the
average secrecy age. This is because E can eavesdrop the status updates from S with a higher
success probability. We can also observe from Fig. 1 that the average secrecy age decreases as
the transmission probability ptx increases, which coincides with our analysis in Remark 1.
We depict in Fig. 2 the curves of the objective function in Problem 1, ptx [1− Pout (ptx)],
versus the transmission probability ptx with varying secrecy age outage threshold ηth and q. As
we can see from the figure, the simulation and analytical results once again coincide. In addition,
there is an optimal ptx in all simulated cases. Furthermore, the optimal values corresponding to
the closed-form solution to Problem 1 appear at the peaks of the curves, which validates the
attained solution. We also can observe from Fig. 2 that the optimal value of ptx shifts to the
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left as either ηth or q increases, which again affirms the expression of the optimal ptx given by
p∗tx = min {1/(qηth), 1}.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This letter studied the problem of maintaining information freshness of status update systems
under eavesdropping attacks. To that end, we studied the classical three-node wiretap channel.
Considering that the conventional channel capacity-based secrecy metrics are no longer adequate
to characterize the secrecy performance of status update systems, we proposed two new age
of information-based secrecy metrics, termed secrecy age and secrecy age outage probability.
We also derived the closed-form expressions of the average secrecy age and the secrecy age
outage probability for the considered three-node system by applying a two-dimensional Markov
chain to model the dynamic age evolutions at both the destination and the eavesdropper. We
further designed and optimized a randomized stationary policy implemented at the source for
enhancing the system secrecy performance. Simulation results were finally provided to validate
and substantiate our design and analysis.
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